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Summary 
By Anne Corden and Patricia Thornton, Social Policy Research Unit, University of York 
 
Results-based Funded Supported Employment: Avoiding 
Disincentives to Serving People with Greatest Need
 
Supported Employment is a long-established and 
important element of Government programmes for 
disabled people, aiming to provide support in jobs 
for disabled people who face more complex 
barriers to finding and keeping work.  
 
The Modernised Supported Employment 
Programme, WORKSTEP, took effect from April 
2001, with a new emphasis on increasing the 
proportion of people who move from supported to 
mainstream employment. Other key elements are 
new eligibility criteria, a new funding framework 
and quality standards.  
 
The new funding arrangements replaced an 
occupancy-based funding mechanism which 
tended to discourage progression. Local authority, 
voluntary body, and now private, providers of 
supported employment services are now funded 
via a structure which combines results-based 
payments for development planning, placement, 
progression and sustained progression with post-
placement ongoing monthly payments for training 
and support. This structure aimed both to provide 
incentives to providers to work with clients 
towards mainstream employment, and to provide 
safeguards for supported employees who need 
long term support.  
 
One concern of policy makers was that the new 
funding model could discourage providers from 
working with supported employees with the 
greatest support needs. More information was 
required here, and the Department for Work and 
Pensions asked the Social Policy Research Unit 
at the University of York to conduct a review of 
results-based funding in supported employment 
systems.  
 
This review was conducted in April and May 2002, 
and included published reports and articles, and 
unpublished material from practitioner contacts. 
The researchers searched on the Internet, 
restricting the search to employment services for 
disabled people and material written in English. 
 
 
Key findings 
 
x It appears that results-based funding is not 
applied to employment services for disabled 
people in other European countries or in 
English-speaking countries other than USA, 
Australia and UK.  
 
x Models of results-based funding are 
widespread, where ‘Milestones’ developed in 
Oklahoma in 1992 and was adopted state-wide 
in 1997. Variants of this model, included in this 
review, were being used in Massachusetts, 
Kentucky, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania and 
Alabama. An enhanced model to meet specific 
needs of services for people with mental health 
problems began in New York in 2000. 
 
x In Australia, the Case Based Funding Trial of 
services providing assistance in from 1999 to 
2002. 
 
x Adverse selection of clients (called ‘creaming’) 
is considered a potentially serious problem in 
the models studied, and is addressed 
structurally in the design of the payment 
systems. Different approaches all aim to 
maintain providers’ confidence that they can 
manage the perceived economic risk of 
providing services to clients who may need 
more support. 
 
x There is rather little direct evidence of the 
effectiveness of these approaches in 
preventing or reducing adverse selection. 
 
x In the WORKSTEP context, approaches which 
depend on scoring or categorisation of clients 
may not be helpful. However, the review 
suggests a number of other modifications and 
adjustments to the WORKSTEP payment 
model which might be worth considering to 
reduce potential incentives for adverse 
selection.
Executive Summary 
 
Introduction 
 
In May 2002 the Social Policy Research Unit at 
the University of York conducted a review of 
results-based funding in supported employment 
systems. The context was policy makers’ concern 
that the funding model in WORKSTEP, the 
modernised Supported Employment Programme, 
could discourage service providers from working 
with supported employees with the greatest 
support needs. 
 
WORKSTEP reforms took effect from April 2001. 
Key elements were new eligibility criteria; targets 
for progression into mainstream employment; a 
new funding framework and the promise of quality 
standards. 
 
The new payment structure for local authorities 
and voluntary body providers combined ongoing 
payments with outcome payments: 
 
x payments for Development Plans (£500) and 
Job Starts (£250) support essential pre-entry 
work with new recruits 
x Monthly Payments (different rates) fund the 
support needed by employee and employer 
x payments for Progression to open 
employment (£500) fund new entrants 
x payments for Sustained Progression after six 
months (£500) reflect need of some people 
for longer support 
x availability of progression payments for 
existing employees helps providers invest in 
their development. 
 
The researchers drew on known published 
material on supported employment in USA and 
Australia and on practitioner contacts leading to 
unpublished material. An Internet search was 
conducted in English. Results-based funding 
appears to be applied to employment services for 
disabled people only in USA, Australia and UK. 
 
 
The Rationale for Results-Based Funding 
 
The first models of results-based funding 
emerged in the USA during the 1990s. 
‘Milestones’ developed in Oklahoma and spread 
rapidly to other states, and variants were 
influential in design of the Australian model.  
 
Supported employment was added to the USA 
federal/state vocational rehabilitation scheme in 
1986 and grew rapidly. A variety of purchase of 
service arrangements was used to fund 
employment services from provider agencies. 
There were moves away from input-based 
purchase arrangements (such as grant payments 
for staff). Payments were sometimes based on 
process (such as slot-based contracts for 
provision of specific activities) and increasingly on 
output to reflect product (for example, an hourly 
rate for job coaching). 
 
Concerns were that since payments did not reflect 
quality of service, there were no opportunities for 
quality control; and there were no incentives to 
move clients on. At the same time, there was 
concern that the high cost programme was not 
delivering outcomes valued by clients. Providers 
argued that payments did not match costs, and 
involved excessive bureaucracy.  
 
Results-based funding appeared to offer potential 
opportunities. Such a model compensates 
providers for measured outcomes of service - the 
impact on participants of the programme results. 
The ultimate outcome reflects a change in the 
person, addressing initial assessment of their 
need. Intermediate outcomes may reflect 
contributory services. Outcomes must be valued 
by the client and measurable. Advantages then 
perceived include increased emphasis on valued 
outcomes; increased accountability; greater 
efficiency and effectiveness in delivery; and 
greater choice and satisfaction for clients. 
 
For these advantages to be realised requires 
agreement between actors about clients’ needs 
and desired outcomes, and what the programme 
can deliver; appropriate and achievable outcome 
measures; and payment levels which enable 
financial viability for providers. 
 
Potential disadvantages have also been 
identified. Providers might select clients who are 
relatively easier to help (‘creaming’). They might 
take advantage of contracts without adopting 
intentions (‘gaming’) or see conflict between 
achieving set outcomes and the overall mission of 
their organisation. There could be potential threat 
to quality of service, and competition between 
non-profit and business providers might act to 
reduce market choice.  
 
Results-Based Funding Models 
 
The underlying principle is that, following 
assessment of individual need for employment 
support, the provider supplies services to enable 
progression towards placement in a sustainable 
job. A small number of defined service outcomes, 
and in some cases additional process outcomes, 
serve as benchmarks, achievement of which 
results in payment to provider.  
 
The full text explains in detail the main structural 
features and contextual background of the models 
studied, from data available in 2002.  
 
The Oklahoma Milestones has been highly 
influential. In 2002 this model used six milestone 
payments for outcomes of assessment; job 
preparation; job placement; four weeks retention; 
ten weeks retention; and closure. There were two 
levels of funding (‘regular’ and ‘highly challenged’) 
in each of two models, reflecting different needs 
for preparation and enabling providers to offer 
appropriate levels of services (a ‘tiered’ structure). 
Quality standards were incorporated in service 
requirements for each benchmark payment.  
 
Variants of Milestones were developed in 
Alabama, Massachusetts, Kentucky, Rhode 
Island and Pennsylvania. Some were  ‘blended 
models’ with a mix of results-funded service 
outcome benchmarks and additional support 
services with fee-for-service  funding to enable 
providers to meet individual needs. Most fee-for-
service payments were capped. 
  
New York Office of Mental Health: a small pilot 
began in 2000 to enhance and develop existing 
results-based programmes, specifically to help 
some people with mental health conditions who 
failed to reach later milestones. Two additional 
milestone payments funded support for longer 
than usual, and an additional payment for support 
continuing beyond nine months aimed to increase 
job retention and assist with career advancement 
or job changes. 
 
Australian Case Based Funding Trial for Disability 
Employment Assistance: was part of a broad 
reform of rehabilitation and employment services. 
Initially, a Job Seekers’ Classification Instrument 
assigned clients to one of three funding levels. 
There was then one payment for employment 
outcome, and two sets of monthly payments, from 
commencement of service and for maintenance 
after placement, respectively. Evaluation 
suggested that some people were disadvantaged 
by this model. Two new assessment instruments 
were developed for Phase 2 with adoption of five 
funding levels. 
 
 
Addressing the Problem of Creaming 
 
A results-based funding scheme creates 
incentives to serve those clients who can most 
quickly and easily be brought to the payment 
points (‘creaming’). A related problem is leaving 
behind clients thought likely to need more 
services to reach outcomes, and sacrificing later 
outcome payments (‘parking’). 
 
Structural approaches to these potentially serious 
problems in supported employment aim to 
maintain providers’ confidence that they can 
manage the perceived economic risk. Different 
approaches revolve around ways of: 
x ensuring overall economic viability in the 
programme  
x setting different benchmarks for clients with 
greater needs  
x providing higher compensation for providing 
services to client groups or individuals with 
greater needs, for example in a tiered 
structure  
x providing additional fee-for-service funding to 
meet needs of individuals, for example in 
blended models  
x requiring ‘quotas’ of people with greater 
needs among outcomes   
x external control and management of referral 
of clients to providers. 
 
 
Reviewing the Evidence 
 
The Oklahoma Milestones has been reviewed via 
a series of interviews with key vocational 
rehabilitation personnel and provider surveys. The 
approach is generally reported as a success. 
Reduction of clients assessed but not placed in 
work suggests that the model has some effect in 
reducing ‘parking’.  
 
The interim report from evaluation of the 
Australian trial concluded that there was no 
pattern of ‘under-servicing’ clients who do not 
achieve an outcome, but the model had not 
entirely eliminated either creaming or parking. 
Suggestions for reducing parking further included 
replacing the ongoing payments with more 
milestone payments; adjusting weightings of both 
ongoing and outcome payments; and improved 
client tracking and audit. 
 
 
Implications for WORKSTEP  
 
The review, by design, did not address potential 
advantages and opportunities in paying supported 
employment providers for results. Focusing on the 
main potential disadvantage raises the following 
issues in the WORKSTEP context.  
 
Fundamental to the US and Australian models is 
the concept of ‘categorisation’ of clients. Scoring 
a person’s need for employment support is no 
easy task. Developing appropriate instrumentation 
in the UK would require time and resources, and 
raise complex administrative issues. Moreover 
there is increasing rejection in the UK of 
categorising people on the basis of disability. 
Current eligibility criteria for WORKSTEP are fairly 
broad based, and development of a ‘tiered 
structure’ might involve looking for simple proxies 
for need for support that fit a social model of 
disability. 
 
Selection of clients for WORKSTEP depends on 
some discretionary decisions and working 
relationships between providers and Disability 
Employment Advisers. This stage of referral and 
acceptance is receiving increasing attention within 
the USA and Australia. It will be important to 
understand ways in which people are referred for 
the WORKSTEP programme, and to monitor 
reasons for non-acceptance by providers and 
characteristics of people not accepted. 
 
According to the theory underpinning the US 
models, which weights benchmark payments 
according to risk involved, the first WORKSTEP 
benchmark payment appears relatively high. 
There are no requirements for subsequent 
outcome payments to be linked back to the 
Development Plan, considered important in US 
models for maintaining quality of service and 
progression. The uncapped monthly payments in 
WORKSTEP may provide incentives for some 
providers to stop aiming for the progression 
benchmark. Any consideration of lowering 
monthly rates, however, must take account of the 
fact that, realistically, providers may have 
relatively large numbers of clients who continue to 
require ongoing support services after placement. 
 
The need to protect those people who will 
continue to need considerable support to sustain 
employment represents quite a challenge for the 
WORKSTEP payment model. It might be worth 
considering whether potential incentives for 
adverse selection could be reduced further by: 
x making more links between the Development 
Plan and later benchmarks 
x making continuation of ongoing payments 
contingent on reviewing the Development 
Plan, with management of this process by a 
third party 
x introducing ‘targets’ in terms of proportions of 
participants achieving later benchmarks which 
each provider must meet.  
 
Considerable importance is attached in other 
countries to dialogue and consultation with 
stakeholders to achieve a payment model that 
works well.  
 
 
